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Abstract
■ Despite the intuition that strongly held beliefs are particularly
difficult to change, the data on error correction indicate that gen-
eral information errors that people commit with a high degree
of belief are especially easy to correct. This finding is called the
hypercorrection effect. The hypothesis was tested that the reason
for hypercorrection stems from enhanced attention and encoding
that results from a metacognitive mismatch between the personʼs
confidence in their responses and the true answer. This experi-
ment, which is the first to use imaging to investigate the hyper-
correction effect, provided support for this hypothesis, showing
that both metacognitive mismatch conditions—that in which
high confidence accompanies a wrong answer and that in which
low confidence accompanies a correct answer—revealed anterior
cingulate and medial frontal gyrus activations. Only in the high
confidence error condition, however, was an error that conflicted
with the true answer mentally present. And only the high confi-
dence error condition yielded activations in the right TPJ and the
right dorsolateral pFC. These activations suggested that, during
the correction process after error commission, people (1) were
entertaining both the false belief as well as the true belief (as in
theory of mind tasks, which also manifest the right TPJ activation)
and (2) may have been suppressing the unwanted, incorrect
information that they had, themselves, produced (as in think/
no-think tasks, which also manifest dorsolateral pFC activation).
These error-specific processes as well as enhanced attention
because of metacognitive mismatch appear to be implicated. ■
INTRODUCTION
Although the production of errors is a human shortcom-
ing that has been subject to considerable study, the pro-
cesses involved in how people correct those errors have
only recently begun to receive intensive scrutiny. There is
no doubt that understanding the processes of error cor-
rection is central to understanding human cognition inso-
far as the correction of mistakes and the updating of our
knowledge are necessary for learning in all domains. People
need to correct errors to be in a position to make realistic
and appropriate decisions, whether a student correcting
incorrect information for a future test, a physician correct-
ing a diagnosis, or a teacher, shopkeeper, business person,
police officer, judge, or president keeping their knowledge
correct and current. Indeed, the progress of scientific inves-
tigation itself can be seen as an ongoing process of error
generation (of wrong hypotheses) and error correction as
we refine our knowledge.
There are now many studies showing that, unless the
individual is given feedback concerning the correct answer
rather than only a signal that an error has been made, later
accurate responding is unlikely (Metcalfe & Finn, 2010;
Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005). In addition,
the personʼs confidence or degree of belief in the original
error has consequences for both the processes and prob-
ability of error correction. It is this relation between
confidence and error correction that is the focus of this
study.
There is considerable evidence that peopleʼs metacog-
nitions concerning their responses are generally accurate
(Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky,
2000; Koriat, 1993, 1997; Murdock, 1974). When people
express a high degree of confidence in a response, they
are likely to be correct. Low confidence is associated with
incorrect responses. Presumably, the reason for the high
correlation between peopleʼs confidence in their answers
and the correctness of those particular answers is that
high confidence is associated with strong and easily ac-
cessible memories and beliefs (see Finn & Metcalfe,
2010; Koriat, 1993, 2008, for a model of this relation). Re-
sponses given with low confidence are likely to be either
guesses or weaker and less-entrenched beliefs. Given
that high confidence self-generated responses are strong
and interference resistant, they should also be particu-
larly difficult to alter. Many perspectives from interfer-
ence theory (Barnes & Underwood, 1959) and PDP
(parallel distributed processing) and computational mod-
els of memory (e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1987)
and many experiments in the misleading information
(e.g., Loftus & Hoffman, 1989) and false memory para-
digms (e.g., Fazio & Marsh, 2009; Roediger &McDermott,Columbia University
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1995) converge on the conclusion that high confidence is
associated with strong and accessible responses.
It follows that if a high confidence response is erro-
neous, it, too—like correct high confidence responses—
should be strong and resistant to being overwritten. In
stark contrast to this prediction, however, it has been
found (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; see Kulhavy, Yekovich,
& Dyer, 1976) that high confidence errors are easier to cor-
rect than low confidence errors. This surprising phenom-
enon is called the “high confidence error hypercorrection
effect” or, sometimes, the “hypercorrection effect.” In typi-
cal experiments showing this effect, people are given a
series of general information questions. After each ques-
tion, they give their answers, followed by their confidence
in the correctness of their answers. They are then given the
correct answer as feedback. At some later time, participants
are tested for the correct answers. The now-standard find-
ing is that errors that were expressed with higher confi-
dence are more likely to be corrected on this final test
than are errors that were committed with lower confi-
dence. The original hypercorrection findings have now
been replicated many times (Metcalfe & Finn, 2011, in
press; Butler, Fazio, & Marsh, 2010; Fazio & Marsh, 2009,
2010; Sitzman & Rhodes, 2010; Butterfield & Metcalfe,
2001, 2006; Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Kulhavy & Stock,
1989; Kulhavy et al., 1976), and a dominant hypothesis
concerning the locus of the phenomenon has emerged.
The dominant explanation—an explanation that we
will both investigate and extend in the present imaging
experiment—posits that the hypercorrection effect oc-
curs because there is enhanced attention to the correct
responses for high confidence errors because of meta-
cognitive mismatch. When people experience the con-
trast of their beliefs in their answers with the knowledge
that that answer is incorrect, the dissonance results in
heightened attention being paid to the corrective feed-
back. To give an example: When people say with high
confidence that the capital of Canada is Toronto, only
to find that it is actually Ottawa, they are surprised by
their high confidence errors. The heightened atten-
tion because of the metacognitive mismatch results in
hyperencoding of the correction and enhanced memory
for it.
Note that, in the error correction paradigm, there are
two conditions that exhibit metacognitive mismatch. One
is the case in which the person makes a high confidence
error and finds out that he or she is wrong. The other is
the case in which the person makes a low confidence cor-
rect response—essentially, a guess out of the blue—and
finds out that he or she is correct.
Three lines of research support the metacognitive mis-
match hypothesis as a locus of hypercorrection of high
confidence errors. First, Butterfield and Metcalfe (2006)
tested the hypothesis directly by having participants engage
in a simultaneous attention-demanding tone-detection task
while they were answering questions and receiving cor-
rective feedback. They were interested in both high confi-
dence errors and low confidence corrects. Although these
latter responses are not errors, Butler, Karpicke, and
Roediger (2008) have shown that, without feedback, the
participant is very likely to produce an incorrect response
later. Butterfield and Metcalfeʼs (2006) rationale was that, if
the hypercorrection effect was because of enhanced atten-
tion to the surprising response due to metacognitive mis-
match, then participants would be likely to miss hearing a
faint tone that required attention to detect, if it was pre-
sented during the (visual) feedback in both the high con-
fidence error and low confidence correct metacognitive
mismatch conditions. This symmetrical and selective atten-
tional effect was what they found.
Fazio and Marsh (2009), too, proposed that the hyper-
correction effect obtains because people invest extra atten-
tion in those particular corrections because of surprise at
being wrong or what we call here metacognitive mismatch.
They argued that if the effect was because of attention
then the background setting of the to-be-remembered cor-
rect responses would be better remembered for the high
than the low confidence errors. And, indeed, they found
such enhanced memory for the context. And finally, in an
ERP investigation of the hypercorrection effect, Butterfield
and Mangels (2003) examined the scalp voltage elicited by
the feedback to correct and erroneous responses. They
found a fronto-central P3 component that was associated
with both metacognitive mismatch conditions. The P3 is
a positive component peaking at around 300 msec after
stimulus onset that is classically elicited by rare/novel
events such as in an “oddball” paradigm and is thought
to indicate enhanced attention to the unexpected stimulus
(Picton, 1992). It has been found to be associated with
memory enhancement both in Butterfield and Mangelʼs
hypercorrection study and in general (Paller, McCarthy, &
Wood, 1988). The amplitude of the P3 component in
Butterfield and Mangelsʼ (2003) experiments was graded
by the extent of metamemory mismatch: It was greater
to the feedback to high confidence errors than to medium
confidence errors than to low confidence errors. It was also
greater to the feedback to low confidence correct responses
than to medium confidence correct responses than to high
confidence correct responses.
These three lines of research suggest that an attention-
ally related process probably implicating anterior cingulate
and related frontal areas and attributable to the metacogni-
tive mismatch should be found. Such an activation should
be associated with both metacognitive mismatch con-
ditions: peopleʼs reactions to the feedback to high con-
fidence errors and to the feedback to low confidence
corrects. To further investigate the metacognitive mis-
match hypothesis, the present experiment, which is the
first imaging study directed at the hypercorrection effect,
used fMRI to determine the neural correlates of both
metamemory mismatch conditions during feedback in
the scanner. Although our primary interest centered on
the high confidence errors, the low confidence corrects
presented the mirror image of metacognitive mismatch
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in the prior behavioral studies. Thus, to the extent that
expectation violation was the underlying factor giving rise
to the hypercorrection effect, we expected the brain corre-
lates in the two conditions to be the same (as in the experi-
ments of Butterfield & Mangels, 2003, and Butterfield &
Metcalfe, 2006, in which these two conditions had shown
symmetrical effects; see Hunt, 2009).
Although not disputing the importance of attentional
processes in hypercorrection, other factors also appear
to be involved. In the high confidence error condition,
there is a conflict between what one believes to be true
and what one is told is true. The relation of the errors to
the correct answers has been shown to differ between
high and low confidence errors (Metcalfe & Finn, 2011,
in press), with high confidence errors being more related
to the correct answer than low confidence errors. Huelser
and Metcalfe (2011) have shown that error generation,
per se, facilitates later correct recall and that the benefit
is greater when the errors are related as compared with
unrelated to the target. Of course, in the low confidence
correct metacognitive mismatch condition, there is no
error present at all. It follows that, although the low con-
fidence correct metacognitive mismatch condition should
be similar to the high confidence error condition in terms
of the surprise/attention reaction, it should be different
because no error is present in the low confidence correct
case. In contrast, a mistaken belief, along with the correct
answer, exists in the high confidence error case. In the
condition in which a high confidence error was com-
mitted, then, two conflicting pieces of information are
present: the answer that the participants produced and
affirmed that they believed and the conflicting answer that
they have been told is correct. When no error was com-
mitted, only the correct response produced by the par-
ticipant is present. A differential brain response, then,
should be observable depending upon whether the erro-
neous belief was present as compared with when there
was no erroneous belief. In the high confidence error case
(as contrasted to the low confidence correct case), we
would expect to see activation in areas associated with
consideration and coordination of both incorrect and
correct beliefs. Although other factors may also be impor-
tant in theory of mind (TOM) studies, the need for the
participant to consider and coordinate true and false
beliefs in those studies suggests that there might be over-
lapping areas of activation between the TOM and the
error correction paradigms.
Furthermore, to remember the correct response when
an error has been committed, the learner needs not only
to entertain the correct and incorrect beliefs but also to
discriminate between the two and/or to suppress the
error. Neither discrimination nor suppression is neces-
sary in the low confidence correct condition, of course.
Thus, brain activation associated with discrimination/
suppression of an erroneous response would also be
expected to be selective to the error-correction meta-
cognitive mismatch condition and was not expected in
the correct response condition, regardless of confidence
rating. Saxe (in press) has suggested that this process is
related to dorsolateral pFC (DLPFC) activation. Anderson
and Green (2001) have shown that DLPFC activation is as-
sociated with inhibiting mental activity in a think/no-think
task, in which participants are first asked to learn a cue
target pair but then later are asked to inhibit recall of
the target in the “no-think” condition. Later, their recall
of the target that had been subjected to the no-think con-
dition is impaired (Anderson & Levy, 2006; Anderson &
Green, 2001; see also Nee & Jonides, 2008, for the relation
of interference control to DLPFC activation). Now, it has
not been determined whether the process involved in
error correction necessarily involves suppression, of the
sort that Anderson and colleagues have been exploring,
although it is plausible that it might. If so, the DLPFC
would be a likely area that would exhibit activation.
An alternative possibility, though, is that the person
might use the retrieved error to mediate retrieval of the
targeted correct response. To do so effectively, however,
it would be essential that he or she minimally be able to
discriminate the correct from the incorrect response. Re-
sponse discrimination has also been found to implicate the
DLPFC (e.g., Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli,
2002; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Thus,
DLPFC activation would be expected to occur in the error
correction condition regardless of whether the errors were
suppressed to allow later correct responding or were
remembered and used as (discriminated) mediators to
enhance later correct responding.
The hypotheses in this experiment—which is the first
imaging experiment to investigate the hypercorrection
effect—were that, following feedback to both of the
metacognitive mismatch conditions, we would observe
fronto-centro activations associated with increased atten-
tion based on expectation violation. We expected this
activation to be most prominent in and about the anterior
cingulate. We also expected that there would be particular
activations associated with coordinating two sources of
information—the high confidence errors and the correct
answers. This coordination of true and false beliefs would
be associated with the high confidence error condition but
not with the low confidence correct condition.
METHODS
Participants
Fifteen participants (10 women and 5 men, mean age =
22 years) were included in this experiment. The data from
one participant were excluded, before being analyzed, be-
cause of a failure to demonstrate significant visual cortex
activity to the question–response–confidence cue. This
activation was used as a “screen” to check for problems
in image acquisition. The reason for the failure, in the case
of this participant, is unknown. Participants were all right-
handed native speakers of English, had normal or corrected-
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to-normal vision, and had no history of neurological or
psychological disorders. Before testing, participants were
screened for their knowledge of general information using
a pretest consisting of five easy, five medium, and five
difficult questions that were not repeated during the actual
test. They were excluded from the experiment if they
correctly answered fewer than five or more than 12 ques-
tions on this pretest. All participants provided informed
consent and were compensated at a rate of $12/hour for
their participation.
Materials
The stimuli were 599 general information questions from a
variety of knowledge domains. All questions had answers
that were familiar to at least 95% of previous participants,
and all answers were single words of three to eight letters in
length. This question set included questions used in pre-
vious studies as well as questions added from Internet sites.
Procedure
Importing the hypercorrection paradigm into fMRI pre-
sented several challenges. In previous studies, participants
responded to a general information question and then
immediately received feedback about response accuracy.
This was not possible in the fMRI setting because (1) partic-
ipants would have had difficulty lying still in a scanner for
the multiple hours this procedure entailed and (2) re-
sponding to general information questions (by typing or
speaking the answers) requires movement that would have
created large artifacts. For these reasons, the response
acquisition and the feedback presentation were split into
separate phases. In the test phase, participants gave re-
sponses and rated their confidence in the accuracy of their
responses to general information questions while outside
the scanner. In the subsequent feedback phase, partici-
pants received feedback for a selected set of questions
while in the scanner. Finally, in the retest phase, partici-
pants took a retest over the selected set of questions out-
side the scanner.
The purpose of the test phase was to collect 20 trials
for each of the seven trial types of interest (response
omissions, low/medium/high confidence errors, and low/
medium/high confidence corrects). General information
questions were presented in the center of the computer
screen, and participants were given an unlimited amount
of time to type a response on the computer keyboard. If
participants were not certain about the answer, they were
encouraged to make an educated guess. However, if they
felt that they could not come up with even a remotely
plausible answer, they were told to type “xxx.” For all
responses except omits, participants then rated their con-
fidence in their responses on a scale ranging from −50
(sure incorrect) to 0 (not sure if correct or incorrect) to
50 (sure correct). Participants were encouraged to use the
entire scale. For the tabulation of trial types of interest, the
scale of confidence was split into low confidence (<−17,
i.e., the lowest 33 points), medium confidence (between
−17 and 17, inclusive, i.e., the middle 35 points), and high
confidence (>17, i.e., the highest 33 points) categories.
The program used a letter-matching algorithm to score
the response as a match (75/100 or greater), nonmatch
(less than 70/100), or borderline (greater than 70/100 and
less than 75/100), but participants were not given feed-
back in the first phase. This procedure continued until a
minimum of 20 trials of each of the seven trial types had
been collected (responses of borderline accuracy were
discarded). If the participant answered all 599 questions
before fulfilling the trial count requirement, the program
shifted the edges of the confidence category bins until
20 trials of each type were present.1
After the participant was done with the test phase, the
program selected trials for feedback presentation. This
selection was accomplished pseudorandomly to fulfill two
goals. The first goal was to obtain the highest confidence
errors and the lowest confidence corrects to maximize the
sensitivity of the design to metamemory mismatch. The
second goal was to match errors and corrects on confi-
dence. Thus, the high confidence corrects were not, on
average, of higher confidence than the high confidence
errors. This was essential because, in the feedback phase,
participants were cued with their previous responses and
response confidence before given feedback. Matching
errors and corrects on confidence minimized the possibil-
ity that participants might, based on the confidence with
which it was endorsed, guess the accuracy of a given trial
before the feedback was presented. To this end, the 20 high-
est confidence errors were selected for presentation in the
scanner. The 20 high confidence corrects were chosen by
matching their confidence levels, trial-by-trial, to those of
the 20 highest confidence errors. Thus, “high” confidence
for high confidence errors and high confidence corrects
was as equivalent as possible. Similarly, the 20 lowest con-
fidence correct responses were chosen, and the 20 low
confidence errors were chosen based on a match with
these low confidence corrects. Medium confidence errors
and corrects were also matched in this fashion.
In the feedback phase of the experiment, the participant
was given feedback in the scanner for the 140 trials se-
lected from the test phase. Trials were presented in five
blocks, with trials randomly assigned to blocks so that four
trials of each type (high, medium, and low confidence cor-
rects and errors and response omissions) were randomly
mixed within each block. Twenty “blank” intervals, lasting
4 sec each, were also presented in each block. These were
used as the baseline for the “screen” test noted above,
which was used to check that there were no problems with
image acquisition. Participants were instructed to simply
pay attention during these blank intervals. At no time were
participants warned of a retest.
Each feedback trial lasted 9.5 sec and occurred in the fol-
lowing manner. First, the question–response–confidence
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cue was presented for 4 sec. This consisted of a question
responded to in the test phase, the participantʼs response
to that question, and the participantʼs confidence in that
response. Then, a central fixation crosshair was presented
for 2.5 sec. Then, feedback was presented for 2 sec in the
form of the correct answer in red (if the participantʼs re-
sponse had been either incorrect or “xxx”) or green (if the
participantʼs response was correct). Finally, the screen then
went blank for 1 sec between each feedback trial. The 4-sec
blank intervals were also added at random between trials.
The first feedback trial presentation began 12 sec after
the scanner began acquiring functional images to allow
for tissue steady-state magnetization. A structural scan,
which required 18 min, was acquired after all trials were
complete.
The retest phase was administered out of the scanner
and started approximately 5 min after the structural scan
was complete. Participants were retested on the 140 ques-
tions for which they had received feedback. Participants
gave responses (or entered “xxx”) and rated their response
confidence for each question. No feedback was given.
fMRI Recording
Images were acquired on a General Electric 1.5-T Twin
Speed System with a standard GE head coil. A pillow
and a tape were used to minimize head movement. Func-
tional images were acquired in a single ∼24-min run using
an echo-planar sequence (repetition time = 3000 msec,
echo time = 50 msec, flip angle = 90°). During this
run, 478 sets of 32 contiguous 3.6-mm-thick axial images
were acquired parallel to the anterior–posterior commis-
sure plane (in-plane resolution = 3.125 × 3.125 mm). The
first four volume acquisitions were dummy scans intended
only to approach steady-state magnetization before the
participant began the first trial in Stage 2. After the comple-
tion of the functional task and scan, structural images were
acquired in the form of 124 contiguous 1.2-mm-thick axial
images using an axial 3-D spoiled gradient-recalled se-
quence (repetition time= 3000msec, echo time= 34msec,
flip angle = 45°, in-plane resolution = .9375 × .9375 mm).
The structural scan took ∼18 min to complete.
fMRI Analysis
Each participantʼs structural image was filtered with a
SUSAN (smallest univalue segment assimilating nucleus)
structure-preserving noise reduction filter (Smith & Brady,
1997). All subsequent preprocessing and analysis was
accomplished with SPM99 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom). The
functional images were corrected for slice acquisition
timing, realigned, and coregistered with the structural
images, and both the functional and structural images were
then spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template.
Neural responses associated with the question–response–
confidence cue and the feedback were modeled with
rectangular functions (durations of 4 sec for the question–
response–confidence cue and 2 sec for the feedback
presentation) that were convolved with SPM99ʼs canonical
hemodynamic response function to create the design
matrix for two different general linear models employed
in the analysis.
The model, which will be referred to as the “Accuracy ×
Confidence” model, consisted of eight different event
types: the question–response–confidence cue, the feedback
to omit trials, and low/medium/high confidence errors/
corrects (1 + 1 + 6 = 8 event types). Functional images
were smoothed with a 6-mm FWHM kernel, and the model
was estimated for each participantʼs data (49-sec high-pass
filter).
The model was estimated for each participantʼs data as
it was above, with the exception that each participantʼs
contrast images were intensity normalized against the in-
tercept image and then smoothed with a larger 10-mm
FWHM kernel before entry into the group analysis. The
effects of interest were (1) the contrast between the
BOLD response to feedback for high confidence errors
and low confidence errors, (2) the contrast between
the response to feedback for low confidence corrects
and high confidence corrects, (3) the contrast between
1 and 2, that is, contrasting activity elicited by metamem-
ory mismatch for errors than by metamemory mismatch
for corrects.
We also used a model designed to look for BOLD re-
sponses that distinguished between feedback to errors
that were corrected at retest and those that were not
corrected at retest. This model consisted of six event
types: question–response–confidence cues; low confi-
dence, medium confidence, and high confidence corrects;
errors corrected at retest; and errors not corrected at
retest. The effect of interest for this model was the con-
trast of errors corrected at retest with errors not corrected
at retest.
Figures were generated with the programMRIcro (Rorden
& Brett, 2000). All activations are superimposed over the
average normalized structural images of all participants. All
figures are displayed in neurological orientation. Figures
show voxel activations reliable at |t(13)| > 2, for qual-
itative display of the results, and activations reliable at
|t(13)| >= 5.2, for display of the statistical reliable results
( p < .05, Bonferroni corrected for number of resolution
elements, as estimated by SPM99). Finally, the Talairach
Daemon anatomical labels and coordinates were deter-
mined using the MSU utility for SPM99, which was written
by Sergey Pakhomov.
Behavioral Results
Each participantʼs mean response probability was weighed
equally in the calculation of the across-participant mean
probabilities displayed in Table 1.
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Basic Data
Participants correctly responded to an average of 34% of
the questions at initial test. The first column of Table 1
shows the probability of each confidence level at first test
and includes all trials, not only those selected for feedback
presentation. The second column also includes all first
test trials and shows that participantsʼ confidence ratings
were predictive of initial test accuracy: The mean gamma
correlation between confidence and initial test accuracy
was .64, t(13) = 23.9, p < .001 (for a description of the
gamma correlation, see Nelson & Narens, 1980). Most of
the 80 errors presented at retest were corrected; average
retest accuracy was 69%.
Hypercorrection Effect
As in the previous experiments, participants were more
likely to correct errors endorsed with higher confidence:
The mean gamma correlation between confidence in an
error of commission and retest accuracy was .14, t(13) =
3.5, p < .005.
fMRI Results
High Confidence Errors
The primary interest in this experiment was whether
neural activity to the corrective feedback, as indexed by
the BOLD response, would be modulated by the confi-
dence with which the error was originally endorsed. This
question was addressed by contrasting the activity elicited
by feedback to high confidence error trials with that elic-
ited by low confidence error trials (see Figure 1). Locations
evidencing such differential activation included an area
spanning the bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus and the right
medial frontal gyrus. Another area modulated by error con-
fidence spanned parts of the right middle frontal gyrus and
right precentral gyrus or, broadly, the DLPFC. The third
and final area was in the right inferior parietal lobule
(IPL) or, broadly, the right TPJ. No areas evidenced signifi-
cantly greater activity for low confidence errors than for
high confidence corrects.
Low Confidence Corrects
Like errors, correct responses can reveal metamemory mis-
match, as was shown both in Butterfield and Metcalfeʼs
(2006) and in Butterfield andMangelsʼ (2003) experiments.
Indeed, in those experiments, the responses were of about
the same magnitude for error-related metamemory mis-
match and for correct response metamemory mismatch.
Metamemory mismatch elicited by feedback to correct
trials is, of course, greater for low confidence correct re-
sponses than for high confidence correct responses. Our
question was whether the same areas were activated for
error-related and for correct-response metamemory mis-
match. As is shown in Figure 2, the medial frontal gyrus
was more active for low confidence correct responses than
for high confidence correct responses. This area was sim-
ilar, although somewhat more dorsal, to the area of ACC
and medial frontal gyrus found in the error confidence
analysis. No areas evidenced significantly greater activity
for high confidence corrects than for low confidence
corrects.
Omits
There was no significant difference in activations be-
tween the low confidence error responses and omit
(or “xxx”) responses. As might be expected from this
result, when we contrasted omits to high confidence
errors, the resultant pattern was highly similar to that
found for the contrast between low confidence er-
rors and high confidence errors. The same regions
seen in latter contrast showed up at a lenient criterion
in the former but did not reach the strict criterion for
significance.
Differences in Activation for High Confidence Errors
versus Low Confidence Corrects
This contrast addresses the question of whether there is
additional processing of high confidence errors over and
above that implied by metamemory mismatch per se.
Contrasting metamemory mismatch for errors with meta-
memory mismatch for corrects revealed relatively more














Omit .23 (0.03) Omit – (–) Omit .49 (0.05)
Low .26 (0.04) Low .15 (0.02) Low .70 (0.05)
Medium .25 (0.03) Medium .39 (0.03) Medium .78 (0.05)
High .26 (0.04) High .78 (0.03) High .79 (0.05)
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Figure 1. Contrast map of high confidence errors and low confidence errors. Red areas were more active for high confidence errors, whereas
green areas were more active for low confidence errors; both thresholded at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001. Yellow and blue areas,
respectively, denote areas of higher and lower activation for high confidence errors at a family-wise-corrected p level of .05. These more stringently
thresholded areas are small and barely visible.
Table of values corresponding to Figure 1.
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activity for error mismatch in the right DLPFC and the right
IPL (TPJ), as is shown in Figure 3. These areas revealed
more sensitivity to metamemory mismatch for errors than
to metamemory mismatch for correct trials.
Error Correction
Finally, we looked for activation that distinguished be-
tween errors corrected at retest and errors not corrected
Figure 2. Contrast maps of low confidence corrects and high confidence corrects. Red areas were more active for low confidence corrects, whereas
green areas were more active for high confidence corrects; both thresholded at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001. Yellow and blue areas,
respectively, denote areas of higher and lower activation for low confidence corrects at a family-wise-corrected p level of .05. These more stringently
thresholded areas are small and barely visible.
Table of values corresponding to Figure 2.
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at retest. No areas were significantly more active for items
corrected at retest than for items forgotten at retest. The
absence of significant results for this analysis may have
occurred because of a lack of power. There were a number
of areas associated with the reverse contrast—bilateral cin-
gulate gyrus, paracentral lobule, precentral gyrus, postcentral
gyrus, precuneus, medial frontal gyrus, insula, right middle
frontal gyrus and putamen, and left superior temporal gyrus
and middle temporal gyrus—perhaps revealing irrelevant
and off-task processing.
DISCUSSION
A main cluster of brain activity was found to both the
feedback to high confidence errors and the feedback to
Figure 3. Maps of the contrast of high confidence errors and low confidence errors contrasted with the contrast of low confidence corrects and
high confidence corrects. Red areas were more active for metamemory mismatch to errors than for metamemory mismatch to corrects, both
thresholded at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001. Yellow and blue areas, respectively, denote areas of higher and lower activation for
metamemory mismatch to errors at a family-wise-corrected p level of .05. These more stringently thresholded areas are small and barely visible.
Table of values corresponding to Figure 3.
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low confidence corrects, which appears to relate to
metamemory mismatch, as hypothesized. This area was
a fronto-medial cluster spanning parts of bilateral ACC,
bilateral medial frontal gyrus, and right cingulate cortex.
The activation of this particular area is consistent with the
idea that metacognitive mismatch is focally involved in
the hypercorrection effect. Both metacognitive mismatch
conditions showed activation in an area implicated in
conflicting ideation. The activation observed in this area
is also broadly consistent with the p3a deflection associated
with metacognitive mismatch in the hypercorrection para-
digm revealed in the earlier ERP (Butterfield & Mangels,
2003) investigation.
The medial frontal gyrus region, again, activated in
both metacognitive mismatch conditions, has been impli-
cated in the conscious monitoring of emotional states
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) including making
personally relevant decisions or mental state attributions,
especially attributions that are self-relevant ( Jenkins
& Mitchell, 2011; Powell, Macrae, Cloutier, Metcalfe, &
Mitchell, 2009; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, &
Kelley, 2004), as well as in making metacognitive deci-
sions (Fleming & Dolan, in press; Fleming, Weil, Nagy,
Dolan, & Rees, 2010) including, but not limited to, self-
relevant metacognitive decisions (Miele, Wager, Mitchell,
& Metcalfe, 2011). That such processing should be impli-
cated in error correction was not specifically expected in
this paradigm insofar as error correction might be consid-
ered to be a cool (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) unemotional,
non-self-involving cognitive process. However, partici-
pants in our experiments often reported being highly in-
volved in their beliefs and sometimes reported some
embarrassment, in the case of their high confidence errors,
and delight, in the case of their low confidence correct
responses. Thus, it is not inconsistent with the phenomen-
ology sometimes reported in this task that people would
be self-involved in the correctness of their stated beliefs.
This connection to self-relevant emotional responding
and the negative emotions that may be elicited upon hear-
ing that oneʼs high confidence responses were incorrect
may also help explain the slight shift in location of activa-
tion in this cluster during feedback to high confidence er-
rors as compared with low confidence corrects. The medial
frontal activation to the mismatch on corrects was slightly
more dorsal overall than the mismatch on errors. This dif-
ferencemay have occurred because people may have had a
different emotional response to learning that they had
been correct as compared with learning that they had been
wrong. This distinction and its connection to variants in the
cognitive nature as compared with the emotionality of the
response has been underlined by Bush, Luu, and Posner
(2000); Steele and Lawrie (2004); and Amodio and Frith
(2006), who have provided detailed descriptions and a
meta-analyses of these shifts in function.
As well as the common frontal areas, which confirm
the metacognitive mismatch hypothesis, there were two
additional areas that were sensitive only to trials on which
errors were committed. The dorsolateral prefrontal acti-
vation was associated selectively with the processing of
high confidence error feedback and not with low confi-
dence correct feedback. One primary difference between
the two metacognitive mismatch conditions is, of course,
the presence of the wrong answer, in the error correction
case. To prepare for future correct responding, the person
who had made an error not only has to encode the correct
answer more fully (as in the correct answer case) but also
has to discriminate the correct answer from the wrong
answer and suppress the wrong answer. Neither discrimi-
nation nor suppression is needed in the low confidence
correct response case.
The right DLPFC, which is associated with both sup-
pression and response discrimination, was selectively acti-
vated in the error condition but not the correct responding
condition. MacDonald et al. (2000), in a highly influential
model, have also proposed that the DLPFC acts as a con-
troller that resolves conflict. There was a conflict of repre-
sentations only in the error condition, of course. In the
case of the hypercorrection situation, presumably, the con-
flict would be between the incorrectly retrieved answer and
the presented correct answer. Hayama and Rugg (2009)
have argued that the right DLPFC plays a role in post-
retrieval monitoring more generally. Both the correct and
error responses would have been in a postretrieval state.
Certainly, some kind of monitoring and discrimination be-
tween the correct and incorrect responses is needed, and
this role for the DLPFC is also consistent with the present
paradigm. And, as noted earlier, Anderson and his col-
leagues (Anderson & Levy, 2006; Anderson et al., 2004)
have investigated the specific role of the DLPFC in the sup-
pression of unwanted memories—a possibility that seems
eminently plausible in the present case, but only when an
error has been committed. According to their research,
when people do not want to think about certain memories,
they can inhibit their retrieval—a process that their results
show—implicates the right DLPFC. Suppression results
in impaired retention of those unwanted memories. It is
plausible that the DLPFC activation we observed in our
task, selectively in the error correction condition, reveals
the engagement of this suppression mechanism to under-
mine memory for the originally retrieved errors. Their
suppression, as well as the enhanced attention to the cor-
rect response, would allow mnemonic processing to focus
selectively on the correct answers and reveal a hyper-
correction pattern in the data.
The behavioral data on whether suppression (which
involves forgetting of the error) or mediation (which could
involve strategic remembering of the error as a cue to get-
ting to the target), either of which would involve DLPFC
activation, was at play in hypercorrection are, unfortu-
nately, inconclusive to date. Butterfield and Mangels
(2003) and Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001) both asked par-
ticipants to produce three responses on the final test and
put a star beside the response that was correct. If suppres-
sion of the original error was necessary for error correction,
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then a negative contingency between the production of the
original error and correct responding should have
emerged. If a mediation process by which the person used
the error to help retrieve the target had occurred, then
there should have been a positive contingency between
the production of the original error and correct respond-
ing. Unfortunately, neither the suppression nor the media-
tion hypothesis was supported, insofar as it made no
difference for correct responding, whether the original
error was mentally present or not at time of test. So, we
are not in a position to infer whether the DLPFC activation
was because of discrimination or suppression. Even so,
both suppression and discrimination (needed for media-
tion to be effective) are implicated in this region, and per-
haps, both were at work. (It is conceivable that more
detailed event-specific future imaging could pinpoint the
locale of these two different processes.)
Finally, the right TPJ—taken broadly, as in the work of
Van Overwalle (2009), Decety and Lamm (2007), and
others, to include the IPL—was selectively activated to
the feedback to high confidence errors. This is an area
that is activated in TOM tasks (Zaitchik et al., 2010; Van
Overwalle, 2009; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Saxe & Powell,
2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;
although, note that the peak activation in the present
hypercorrection paradigm was about 25 mm dorsal to
the peak of the story-based TOM activation identified in
a recent meta-analysis by Mar, 2011). Although this gen-
eral TPJ region is also implicated in other tasks such as
empathy (e.g., Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety,
2006), reorienting (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002),
and agency detection (e.g., Miele et al., 2011; Farrer &
Frith, 2002), its involvement in the error correction task
seems most akin to that in the TOM tasks.
Like the error correction task investigated here, classi-
cal TOM tasks involve the consideration of alternative
beliefs—those of the self compared with those of the
other. In the error correction paradigm, it is oneʼs own be-
lief that is false, and one has to accept and remember that
the response given by the computer is the correct answer.
In a typical TOM task, oneʼs own beliefs are considered to
be true, and those of the other, false. For example, one
may have experienced that there are pencils in a Smartieʼs
box but needs to realize that another person would think
that it contains candies. In the hypercorrection paradigm, it
is also a computer holding the alternative “belief,” although
it seems likely that most people attribute the answers given
by the computer to the experimenter, who is a person.
Aside from who is right and wrong, then, the structure of
the false belief task and the error correction task seem to
be fairly similar.
Many researchers have interpreted ToM tasks as impli-
cating more than coordination of two sets of information,
however. Additionally, attributions having to do with an
understanding that other people have minds and that
their minds can hold different beliefs from oneʼs own
mind are often evoked (Decety & Sommerville, 2003;
Ruby & Decety, 2001). It is not clear whether the presence
of any othermind is implicated in the error correction para-
digm. If it were, presumably, it would be a “mind” reflecting
what people in general believe (or perhaps the mind of the
experimenter). Thus, although the informational content
of the TOM tasks and the error correction tasks seem to
be closely related, the central mentalizing aspects of the
two tasks, which provide much of the interest in ToM stud-
ies, may be different. Alternatively, although, and specula-
tively, it is possible that the process of correcting oneʼs
own erroneous beliefs is a social process that involves
understanding that oneʼs own beliefs can be wrong and
that anothersʼ can be right and that updating oneʼs own
erroneous beliefs relies on adopting and accepting the
perspective of others.
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Note
1. For example, if a participant had answered all 599 questions
and had only given 15 low-confidence corrects (which are, for
most participants, the rarest trial type), the program “grew” the
low-confidence category from “below −17” to “below −16” and
so on until there were 20 low-confidence corrects. If there were
now a shortage of medium-confidence errors or corrects, this
category was similarly grown until there were at least 20 trials of
medium-confidence corrects and medium-confidence errors.
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